tainly no disposable income to go to nice restaurants. Smaller towns may o¤er you better prospects, and you can purchase a better house there with your wage.
In the end, irrespective of your education, all of these factors are also in ‡uenced by your own personal preferences. Durham might be closer to relatives, or you might have a special appreciation for monuments and memorials on the National Mall. 1 Together, all these factors determine a spatial equilibrium, in which people choose where to live and wages and rental prices adjust accordingly. What recent research has shown is that the nature of this spatial equilibrium has changed in the US in the past few decades. Large cities such as Washington, DC, New York, or San Francisco are increasingly places for the skilled elites. Those cities have experienced higher wage growth, and their growth has been unequal; concentrating income among educated professionals. At the same time, much of that wage growth has been o¤set by increased rents. Not surprisingly, the share of college-educated workers in these cities has increased.
Those facts can be accounted for by a spatial equilibrium framework as consequences from relative increases in the demand for skilled labor by …rms in large, skilled cities. An important part of the trends may have to do with adoption of computer technology. The mechanism is also most likely related to greater spillovers among those skilled workers in those cities, but the precise nature of those spillovers is still open to more research.
In what follows, I describe in greater detail the research documenting those facts and the lessons that one can derive about the underlying mechanisms. In Section 1, I lay out the facts, and in Section 2, I lay out the explanations. Section 2 includes the presentation of a canonical urban equilibrium model with two occupations that can be used to think through di¤erent mechanisms and discuss the evidence surrounding alternative hypotheses.
KEY FACTS
The key facts about inequality across and within US cities can be summarized as follows: if you have a college degree or, more generally, are a more skilled worker, you are more likely to live in a larger city. Wages in those cities are generally higher, although they are also o¤set by higher rental prices. Those relative wage gains are particularly pronounced among more highly skilled workers, making those large, skilled cities more unequal.
The literature typically identi…es skills with individual characteristics correlated with productivity. High-skilled workers can be identi…ed as ones who have high levels of education, work in high-wage occupations such as management or law, or work in high-wage industries such as professional and business services. One alternative to this vertical de…nition of skill is adopted by Bacolod, Blum, and Strange (2009) , who examine how salaries vary with di¤erent skill dimensions such as cognitive processing or personal interaction. Alternatively, skills can be estimated from structural models (Baum-Snow and Pavan 2013; Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny 2014) .
In spite of this variety of measures, di¤erent papers have recently documented fairly robust facts about spatial inequality in the US around the turn of the twenty-…rst century:
1. Larger cities have a greater concentration of high-skilled workers. This fact is true regardless of how one measures skill. Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013), Eeckhout et al. (2014) , and Davis and Dingel (2017) provide evidence for measures of skill quality based on education and occupation. For example, Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) report that in the late 2000s, about 40 percent of the workforce of cities in the top size decile had a college degree, whereas in cities in the bottom size decile only about 20 percent of the workforce had a college degree.
The extent to which these relationships have changed since the 1980s appears to be dependent on the exact de…nition of skills. Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Diamond (2016) …nd that cities with a high share of college graduates have experienced a larger increase in that share, but Baum-Snow, Freedman, and Pavan (forthcoming) argue that such a relationship is not apparent if skilled workers are rede…ned to include those with "some college."This seems to suggest that much of the change over this period has occurred due to more people …nishing college. The sensitivity of changes over time to de…nitions is probably also a re ‡ection of high persistence of the educational composition of cities, a fact emphasized by Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis (2010) .
Such a sensitivity of time trends to the boundaries between highand low-skilled workers appears to call for a more disaggregated view. Disaggregation reveals that in recent periods both the highest-and lowest-skilled workers tend to concentrate in large cities, with smaller cities exhibiting a more concentrated skill distribution. For example, when measuring skills by education, Eeckhout et al. (2014) …nd that large cities include more college graduates, but also more high school dropouts. Of the latter, many (but not all) appear to be recent international immigrants. 2 The di¤erences in dispersion were not always present. Davis and Dingel (2017) show evidence to the e¤ect that this phenomenon is relatively new, with larger cities exhibiting uniformly more skilled workers in 1980. This move toward a more extreme distribution of skills in recent decades is consistent with Autor and Dorn's (2013) description of a geographic dimension to job market polarization, with cities that have a high share of workers in occupations with intermediate wage levels ("routine intensive" occupations) seeing large shifts in their labor composition toward low-wage occupations ("service" occupations).
2. Nominal wages are overall higher and increasing in larger and in more skill-intensive cities, but real wages are not necessarily.
A key distinction when interpreting geographic data is between nominal and real wages (or income, more broadly), where the latter incorporates a local price adjustment. Because not all goods consumed by households can be freely traded between cities, the law of one price does not necessarily hold everywhere. In particular, land is the ultimate nontradable good and corresponds to a large fraction of households' consumption baskets.
One of the most important stylized facts of urban economics is that larger cities exhibit higher nominal wages. Most recently, Baum-Snow et al. (forthcoming) have calculated that from 2005-07 nominal wages increase 0.065 percent for each percentage increase in city size. Relatedly, Glaeser and Maré (2001) pin the wage di¤erences between urban and rural areas to around 33 percent in 1990. Those relationships have strengthened over time. The elasticity of wages to city size reported by Baum-Snow et al. (forthcoming) for 2005-07 is about 50 percent larger than what they report for 1980. Also, in the working paper version of their 2013 paper, Baum-Snow and Pavan point out that the wage gap between the largest cities (1.5 million people or more) and rural areas increased from 24 percent in 1980 to 33 percent in 2000. These gaps re ‡ect in part the increasing correlation between city size and skill mix, but after controlling for those they remain sizable at 17 percent and 24 percent, respectively, and the trend remains noticeable. There is, moreover, a strengthening of the relationship between the skill intensity of a city and wages, with more skill-intensive cities exhibiting higher wages for both skilled and unskilled workers (Diamond 2016) .
While the relationship between nominal wages and city size is a clear and robust fact of urban economics, this relationship does not necessarily extend itself to real wages. For a recent example, Eeckhout et al. (2014) report that there is no systematic di¤erence in average real wages between cities. Moretti (2013) and Diamond (2016) show, moreover, that cities with a large share of skilled workers are also cities in which rent prices are higher and have increased the most in recent decades. In e¤ect, Moretti (2013) shows that, while inequality of nominal wages across cities has clearly increased, it was met by an increased dispersion in rents, so cross-city inequality in real wages has not increased as strongly.
One important caveat to those …ndings is that the measurement of local price levels is itself fraught. In a recent paper, Handbury and Weinstein (2015) show that typical price indices measured to compare standards of living across cities are biased because they do not properly account for di¤erences in the quality and variety of goods. They …nd that after one properly controls for those, there is a negative relationship between the price of tradable goods and city size. Given existing evidence, this would imply real wages that increase with city size.
3. The skill premium is higher and increasing in larger cities or cities with more skilled workers.
Larger cities appear to be more unequal. When comparing rural areas and the three largest metropolitan areas, Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) report that in 2004-07, the variance of log hourly wages was 0.28 in the former and 0.53 in the latter. This, they show, is a relatively new phenomenon, since in 1979 the variances of log hourly wages for rural areas and the three largest metropolitan areas were 0.19 and 0.24, respectively.
A major focus of the recent literature has been the evolution of the skill premium across and within cities. One robust …nding is that wage premia increase with city size. Eeckhout et al. (2014) and Davis and Dingel (2017) report those relationships for recent data using a variety of skill measures based on education, occupation, or observed real wages. Baum-Snow et al. (forthcoming) also point out that the relationship between skill premium and city size has become more pronounced over time, doubling in its strength over that period.
Finally, recent data also show more skilled cities exhibiting larger skill premia (Moretti 2013) , although the fact does not appear to be robust to the exact de…nition of skill. For example, Beaudry et al. (2010) and Hendricks (2011) do not appear to …nd a robust relationship in recent data. There appears to be more consensus around an increasingly positive relationship between skill composition and skill premia over time. In fact, Beaudry et al. (2010) show evidence that skilled cities had lower skill premia in 1980 and before, but this negative correlation disappeared in the early 2000s. Together, these facts point to the aggregate inequality trends as having an important geographic component, with large, skill-intensive cities leading the charge. 3 
Implications for Interpretation of Wage Inequality
The facts above suggest a reinterpretation of observed trends in wage inequality. A high wage in New York will sound appealing until one realizes how much one needs to pay for rent. Since both wages and rents are higher in large, skill-intensive cities (Fact 2), this suggests that adjusting for the local cost of living could imply less inequality in standards of living than is implied by wages alone, a point explored by Moretti (2013) . He …nds that the real wage di¤erential between college and noncollege workers has increased 20 to 30 percent less than the nominal wage di¤erentials, as rents have increased more quickly in skill-intensive cities.
At the same time, New York may o¤er more than smaller cities in terms of the quality of its restaurants and art scene. Diamond (2016) presents evidence that the increase in rental prices was more than matched by an increase in the amenities provided to residents of more skill-intensive cities. She estimates the e¤ect based on a structural model similar to one we will present in Section 2 below, but in her model, local amenities change endogenously in response to the population composition. She estimates the model using measures of amenities such as quality of public schools, crime rates, and restaurant density, and she …nds that once one accounts for those e¤ects, the inequality of standards of living increases by 30 percent more than what is implied by wage inequality trends alone.
EXPLAINING THE FACTS
The most natural explanation for the set of facts described above, advanced by Berry and Glaeser (2005) , is that the demand for skilled workers has increased more in cities that are larger and more skill intensive, while the demand for unskilled workers has not increased much anywhere. In this section, we explain why such a view is a natural …t for the data. We will then examine di¤erent theories behind that increase in demand, including the rise of computers and externalities.
The most important alternative to labor demand increases is an increase in endogenous sorting for unobserved worker characteristics, so that, for example, among college-educated workers, it is the most productive ones who choose to live in large cities such as New York and San Francisco. Nevertheless, the most recent literature appears to indicate that such sorting is unlikely to be an important driving force behind the observed facts.
In order to build the argument, we rely on a class of equilibrium models that have been originally proposed by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) . In those models, cities exist in …xed locations and are characterized by a production technology for a fully tradable good and by their land availability. At a given wage, …rms in more productive locations seek to attract more workers. However, as workers move into those cities, their demand for housing pushes rents up. Because workers are free to choose where to live, they will only choose to live in cities with high rents if wages are commensurably high. In spatial equilibrium, rents in more productive cities are just high enough to o¤set the productivity advantage of …rms in those cities. The congestion coming from scarce land ensures that all cities are populated in equilibrium, irrespective of the productivity of their workers.
We now build a variant of such a model with workers of di¤erent skills. Similar variants have been used in recent work by Moretti (2013) and Diamond (2016) , among others.
Model Setup
There are N cities, indexed n 2 f1; :::; N g. Each of these cities is equipped with a production technology for a tradable good that depends on the number of high-and low-skilled workers in the city. A representative …rm in city n can produce quantity Y n of the …nal good by employing L H n high-skilled workers and L L n low-skilled workers according to the constant returns to scale production function:
Note that we allow the production function to be city-speci…c. Differences in the production function may also lead certain cities to produce the …nal good using more of one or the other type of labor. Those di¤erences can capture "natural advantages"that can make a city more productive than another. The clearest examples of such advantages include proximity to waterways or to fertile terrain, but one could be naturally skeptical as to whether such natural advantages directly explain the productivity di¤erences between modern cities. In subsequent discussions on the causal mechanisms behind the facts surrounding inequality and geography, we allow for variation in capital stock and for externalities.
Also note that we assume …rms are native to individual cities and stay there. This goes counter to a long-standing emphasis of the spatial economics literature on location decisions of …rms. The assumption is inoccuous, however, because of our assumptions of constant returns to scale and of city-speci…c production technology. One could similarly postulate a model where individual …rms are free to establish themselves in any city and produce using the local technology. In equilibrium, the zero-pro…t condition would imply the same spatial distribution of production. A less inoccuous alternative, which we do not explore, would be to allow entrepreneurs with di¤erent abilities to choose which city to live in. For an example of a framework with this feature, see Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud (2014) .
Labor markets are competitive, so …rms pay wages equal to the marginal product of labor. For each skill level k 2 fL; Hg, this induces the labor demand equation:
where w k n is the wage of workers of type k in city n in terms of the …nal tradable good.
Workers have preferences over the tradable good, housing, and location. For a given worker i, those idiosyncratic experiences are captured by vector worker-speci…c amenity parameters f" 1 (i); " 2 (i); :::; " N (i)g, where " 1 (i) parameterizes the worker-speci…c preference for living in city n. Those capture the extent to which di¤erent workers have preferences for di¤erent cities. They can incorporate, for example, proximity to family or to the place where the worker grew up. A worker indexed i with skill k 2 fL; Hg living in city n enjoys a utility equal to:
where X k n and H k n are, respectively, the amount a worker in city n consumes of the tradable good and of housing. Note again that the worker's utility function is allowed to depend on the city n where the household chooses to live. This captures the notion that amenities, such as weather, can make some cities overall more pleasant than others. Those amenity e¤ects operate in addition to the idiosyncratic preference shifts captured by " n (i). Understanding the origin of such amenities and the extent to which they are endogenous has also been an important topic of research (see Albouy [2012] and Diamond [2016] for recent contributions).
As we will see, preferences for housing play an important role in the model: they introduce a source of congestion at the city level, generating a reason for population to spread across cities in spite of di¤erences in the marginal product of workers. Similar sources of congestion could arise in the presence of other nontradable goods (such as certain traditional services) or trade costs generating home bias in consumption. Other "nonpecuniary" sources of congestion, including pollution and crime, could be captured by endogenizing the amenity parameters.
The workers' purchases of …nal goods and housing has to satisfy their budget constraints. We assume the only income workers receive is their wage, so that
where r n is the rental price of housing, quoted relative to the tradable good. We assume workers can rent houses but not buy them. In a static framework such as the one presented here, this di¤erence is mostly unconsequential. In a dynamic framework, the di¤erence matters since the wealth of workers who purchase housing would become a function of the history of shocks to housing values in the cities where they lived. This has the potential to generate interesting e¤ects over the wealth distribution but would be computationally challenging and has yet to be extensively explored in the literature.
Workers can freely choose in which city to live. We can solve their problem in two stages: …rst, we solve for the optimal choice of housing and …nal goods consumption given that the household lives in some city n. This induces a value function V k n (r n ; w k n ; " n (i)), satisfying:
Given those value functions, the household then selects as its living location the city where it attains the highest value. This induces a labor supply as a function of wages and rental prices. The number of workers of type k in city n is thus given by the fraction of workers who have a draw of the worker-speci…c amenity parameter f" 1 (i); " 2 (i); :::; "
where L k is the total number of workers of type k.
The model is closed by housing market clearing conditions, implying that housing demand within each city has to be equal to housing supply within each city.
where H n is the supply of housing in city n. Finally, we assume that all rental income is appropriated by absentee landlords who only have preferences for the …nal good and do not supply labor. This assumption ensures that the market for the tradable good clears.
Model Parameterization
In what follows we argue that Facts 1, 2, and 3 in Section 1 can be largely explained by cross-city variations in the demand for skilled labor. In particular, we specialize the model by assuming that all di¤er-ences in production functions across locations stem from a skilled-labor augmenting component:
where is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent skill levels, and n is a labor-augmenting parameter speci…c to the labor of collegeeducated workers. The assumption > 1 is consistent with common estimates of the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent types of labor. 4 Under this parameterization, labor demand functions become:
We parameterize the household utility of di¤erent types of workers k living in di¤erent cities n as:
The parameterization assumes a unit elasticity of substitution between …nal goods and housing. The term A n " n (i) captures di¤erences in amenities between cities, with A n incorporating amenities that a¤ect all workers (such as climate or quality of public schools) and " n (i) incorporating worker-speci…c amenities (such as proximity to family).
Under this parameterization, the value function for a household living in city n can be written as:
We also assume that " n (i) has a Fréchet distribution with shape parameter and is drawn independently for each city. This distribution is commonly used in trade models and has the property that it is stable under the max operator, i.e., the max of two random variables that have a Fréchet distribution is also distributed according to a Fréchet. This property makes it particularly convenient for use in aggregate models where agents make discrete choices. Furthermore, under certain conditions, it emerges naturally as the limiting distribution for the max of a sequence of random variables. It can therefore be motivated by the notion that, when considering a given city, individuals are also choosing the best of several living situations that they have available to them within that city.
As we show in the Appendix, one can then derive the labor supply function as:
The parameter controls the degree of heterogeneity in tastes. This in turn governs the supply elasticity of the labor supply. A high value of corresponds to low heterogeneity. Thus, small variations in wages received (or rents paid) by workers in some city n imply large changes in the number of workers willing to live in that city. In particular, for the extreme case in which there is no heterogeneity in tastes, ( ! 1), all workers have to be indi¤erent between all locations, so A n w k n =r n is the same for all n. Conversely, a low value of corresponds to high heterogeneity. In that case, most workers choose where to live based entirely o¤ their idiosyncratic preferences, and variations in the wages (or rents paid) have little bearing on the number of workers living in each city.
In the Appendix, we also show that the average utility of a household that chooses to live in city n is
where is a gamma function. Note that the average utility does not depend on the location, so that we can denote average worker welfare V k without the city subscript. The reason is that as real wages increase in a city, workers who have lower amenity values for that city decide to live there, so that high real wage cities will include more workers with low idiosyncratic preferences for that city. Given the Fréchet distribution of tastes, the positive impact of the real wage on city welfare is exactly o¤set by the negative impact of worker selection. This calculation allows us to write the labor supply condition more compactly as:
Finally, we assume that housing supply does not vary across cities, H n = 1. This rules out land endowment as a key determinant of city size in the model and is consistent with the casual observation that some of the largest cities in the US, such as New York or San Francisco, are con…ned on relatively small land masses. 5
Explaining the Facts with Variation in Skilled-Labor Augmenting Technology
We now show how, at least qualitatively, one can explain the facts in Section 1 entirely as a function of variations in demand. In order to do this, we make the stark assumption that A n = 1 for all n, so that cities do not di¤er by intrinsic amenities. The only exogenous di¤erence between cities is thus given in the skilled-labor augmenting productivity parameter n . That serves as a shifter in the demand for skilled labor in di¤erent cities.
Algebraically, the way in which variation in n implies Facts 1 and 2 is easiest to see in the case of homogeneous preferences ( ! 1). 6 In that case, inspection of equation (6) implies that real wages have to 5 Hsieh and Moretti (2017) explore the e¤ect of land restriction regulations on city size and …nd that because of those restrictions, there is less concentration of population in large cities than there should be, leading to substantial output losses.
6 See the Appendix for a derivation of the results in the general heterogeneous case.
be the same in all locations; that is, for all n where workers choose to live, it must be the case that, for k 2 fL; Hg and n 2 f1; :::; N g,
Substituting this expression in the labor demand equations (3) and (4), we have that:
Taking the ratio of both labor demand functions, we have that
, so that with > 1, cities in which skilled workers are more productive will have a greater proportion of those workers. Substituting the labor demand equations into the CES production function 2, canceling out Y n , and rearranging yields an expression for rents in each city n,
It follows that, along the cross-section of cities, rents increase in n . From the indi¤erence condition (7), nominal wages for both worker types must increase with rents. Thus, cities with a higher fraction of skilled workers are also cities with higher nominal wages for all workers, consistent with Fact 2. At the same time, real wages in those cities are not necessarily higher.
Optimal worker demand for housing implies they will spend a fraction of their income on housing. Using the indi¤erence condition (7), we can write housing demand in terms of rents only:
n : Thus, from housing market clearing condition 1,
This last expression appears to suggest that population increases with rents, consistent with Fact 1. However, this is not necessarily true, since wages of low-skilled workers are generally smaller than those of high-skilled workers, that is, V L < V H . In the Appendix, we show that, for small variations in n around a cross-city average, the population of both types of workers increases with n if and only if < 1. To see why this is necessary, note that as n increases, …rms will hire fewer low-skilled workers for each unit of output they produce. How much substitution occurs depends on the elasticity parameter . However, higher n also implies higher overall output. Thus, the net e¤ect in the demand for low-skilled workers is ambiguous. Output will increase more with productivity if rents are a small share of wage income (low ). Otherwise, workers will demand large wage increases in order to o¤set small increases in rent, thus limiting output variation. To summarize, L L n increases with n if …rms are not too ready to substitute between the two types of workers (i.e., if is low) and if wages are not too sensitive to rents (i.e., if is low). Fortunately, those two parameters have been amply estimated. Typically, the housing share of consumption is pinned at = 1=3, and the elasticity of substitution between collegeand noncollege-educated workers is smaller than = 2. 7 Thus, we can safely assume that < 1, so that demand for both types of employment rises with productivity of skilled workers. It follows that variations in n can thus also account for Fact 1. 8 Finally, in order to explain Fact 3, we need to depart from the model with homogeneous preferences. If workers have identical preferences for living in all cities, the wage premium has to be the same in all
. Fact 3 emerges once one allows for such labor heterogeneity. Manipulating the labor demand and labor supply equations (3), (4), and (6), we thus have that
where the …rst equation we obtain from labor supply and the second from labor demand. Combining the two equations then yields the wage premium:
It follows that, so long as there is some heterogeneity in preferences ( < 1) and > 1, the wage premium increases with n .
7 See Ciccone and Peri (2005) for estimates of : A value of close to 1/3 has been used by Hsieh and Moretti (2017) among others.
8 One interesting question is what happens if there are multiple tradable industries with di¤erent intensities of use for di¤erent workers. Then substitution at the city level may be higher than at the …rm level or in the aggregate, since it can operate through changes in the industrial composition.
Sources of Variation in Demand for Skilled Labor
The recent literature has identi…ed two main sources of variation in the demand for skilled labor: di¤erential biased technical progress, expressed by di¤erences in adoption of computing technology, and externalities. The …rst source has been emphasized by Beaudry et al. (2010) and Autor and Dorn (2013) , whereas the second has been emphasized by Baum-Snow et al. (forthcoming). We discuss those two in turn. 9 A third source of variation in the demand for skilled labor that has been less explored in the literature comes from the industrial composition of cities and, in particular, the importance of the business services sector (Hendricks 2011) . We discuss this third source last.
Computers
One explanation for the increase in the productivity of skilled workers is the adoption of computing technology (Krusell et al. 2000) . This is a natural hypothesis, since computers have become cheaper in the same period in which wage inequality has increased. At the same time, in that same period, many of the trends associated with Facts 1, 2, and 3 have been in play. This has motivated Beaudry et al. (2010) and Autor and Dorn (2013) to propose computerization as an explanation for cross-city variation in wage inequality trends.
To see the role of computer adoption, extend the model to allow the production function to include three inputs, the third of which is capital:
Note that capital is complementary to skilled labor but not to unskilled labor. In the spatial setting, Autor and Dorn (2013) have motivated this complementarity through a task-based approach. Computers are particularly adept at enhancing the ability of workers performing abstract tasks involving creativity, coordination, and problem solving, whereas automation can serve as a substitute for workers performing routine tasks such as bookkeeping, clerical work, and repetitive production.
Suppose computers are a perfectly tradable good, which can be purchased in any city n at the same price p. The price should be understood to incorporate the "quality-adjusted" cost of computers, so that its time variation would include all the large gains in computational power in the past few decades. 10 Then cost minimization implies that K n = 1 w H n p L H n , so that substituting into the production function we have:
The resulting function on the right-hand side is isomorphic to the one in our basic model, with the labor-augmenting technology parameter substituted for an increasing function of the relative cost of skilled labor and computers ( n = 1 1 w H n =p ). As the relative price of computers decreases, …rms use more of those, increasing the relative productivity of skilled workers.
With homogeneous preferences for location ( ! 1), we can rewrite the production function in terms of rents:
Cities with higher rents are also cities where wages are higher and where …rms have the most incentives to adopt computers. This, in turn, generates a correlation between rents and the labor mix of cities. In the presence of heterogeneity in preferences for di¤erent cities ( < 1), cities with higher rents will also feature more wage inequality. Of course, once we endogenize n , we need to have another source of exogenous variation in order to explain di¤erences in rents across cities. One possibility is to still allow for some exogenous variation in the skill premium, possibly due to the location of universities or to allow for citywide productivity di¤erentials.
In order to explain the observed trends, Beaudry et al. (2010) examine an environment in which they can explain observed trends just from the reduction in the price of computers (p). In their environment, apart from the three factors of production, …rms have the option to 1 0 Suppose a unit of an input purchased at a pricep produces z units of output according to a linear technology. Then one can de…ne the quality-adjusted value of the input by p =p=z. In our example, the output would be computational power, and z would capture the increase in quality of computers. choose between technologies with higher or lower intensity in skilled labor. As computers become cheaper, the incentive to use a technology that is more intensive in skilled labor increases. Beaudry et al. (2010) also show, however, that this incentive is stronger in cities where the supply of skilled labor is higher to begin with. 11 This generates a correlation between the adoption of computers and the cross-city supply of skilled labor before computers were adopted, which they verify in the data. Intriguingly, they also show that before computers became an important part of production, the cross-city correlation between skill composition and skill premium was negative, as predicted by our model if there are no important di¤erences in n across cities but there are di¤erences in relative labor supply. As time has progressed and computer adoption has increased, they …nd that correlation ‡ipping and becoming insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero. One limitation of their explanation for the observed trends is that it cannot account for the positive correlation between skill composition and wage premia observed in recent data (or with other de…nitions of skill). In their framework, as the price of computers declines, all cities adopt the skill-intensive technology.
Externalities
An alternative explanation for the di¤erences in demand for skilled labor in di¤erent cities involves the di¤erential impact of local externalities on di¤erent types of workers. Moretti (2004) separates relevant theories into those involving learning and those involving labor markets. 12 Learning-based theories emphasize the role of geographic proximity in facilitating the transfer of knowledge. 13 High-skilled workers perform tasks that are more knowledge-intensive, so they would stand to bene…t more from those transfers. Matching theories exploit pecuniary externalities that emerge in imperfect labor markets. A deeper 1 1 In terms of our model, this would involve extending the utility function to contain a city/skill-speci…c e¤ect, so that
1 2 See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a detailed overview of theories of agglomeration externalities more generally, including the role of sharing, matching, and learning.
1 3 In Marshall's (1890) words "Great are the advantages that people following the same trade get from near neighborhood to one another: the mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are, as it were, in the air." Lucas (1988) follows up by stating that "Most of what we know we learn from other people (. . .) most of it we get for free. We know that this kind of external e¤ect is common to all arts and sciencesthe 'creative professions.'" pool of skilled workers provides an environment where …rms can use them more e¢ ciently. 14 There is an ample empirical literature pointing to human capital externalities as a source of di¤erences in wages across cities (see Moretti [2004] for a review). This literature focuses on the e¤ects of the skill composition of the workforce. Most recently, the role of externalities in explaining observed trends has been examined by Baum-Snow et al. (forthcoming) . In their paper, they focus on what the urban economics literature has called "agglomeration externalities,"i.e., external e¤ects associated with overall city size. They allow for city size to a¤ect the productivity of skilled and unskilled labor separately (and also of capital, which they allow for explicitly). They …nd a robust signi…cant increase over time in the positive agglomeration e¤ect on skilled labor but do not …nd a robust change in the agglomeration (or congestion) e¤ect on unskilled labor. In terms of our model, they …nd n = L H n + L L n , where > 0. 15 They state that such a change in agglomeration externalities can account for 80 percent of the more rapid increase in wage inequality in large cities, with capital accumulation, the other leading alternative discussed above, accounting for less than 20 percent.
Recent work has also tried to disentangle the two sources of local spillovers. Learning and matching theories have di¤erent predictions at the microeconomic level. Learning theories imply that individual productivity is likely to increase with the time that individuals spend in a city and that productivity gains will be embodied in workers who will carry those gains with them if they immigrate. In contrast, matching externalities are unlikely to change with the time a worker has spent in a city and remain speci…c to the city. The evidence is consistent with learning among the high-skilled workers playing an important role, with Glaeser and Maré (2001) , Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) , and De La Roca and Puga (2017) pointing out that high-skilled workers tend to experience faster wage increases when they live in large cities. 16 Understanding why local externalities have become stronger for skilled workers is challenging. One interesting mechanism is explored by Michaels, Rauch, and Redding (2017) . Investigating changes over long periods of time and using a detailed breakdown of occupations into a variety of tasks, they document a rising concentration of occupationintensive "interactive tasks"in cities. Those tasks are ones "concerned with thought, communication, and inter-social activity" and are typically associated with highly skilled occupations such as nurses, accountants, and statisticians. In their model, those tasks tend to become concentrated as the cost of trading them across cities decreases and large cities are able to exploit their comparative advantage in those tasks.
Industrial and Functional Composition
One potential source of variation in demand for skilled labor is variation in industry composition of cities. One extreme case, which is nested in our model, has each city specialize in a single industry. Since industries may have di¤erent skill intensities, such industrial specialization would imply cross-city variation in n . For example, Brinkman (2014) points to the increased concentration of certain skill-intensive industries, such as …nance, in large cities as an important factor explaining some of the trends discussed. However, as argued by Hendricks (2011) , cross-city variation in industrial composition accounts for only a small fraction of cross-city variation in skill composition. Moreover, he shows that most of the variation in skill composition across cities can be tied to variation in a high-skill-speci…c productivity component that is common to all industries.
At the same time, Hendricks (2011) also …nds that cities with a high fraction of skilled workers are also ones with large business services sectors. He proposes a model where, like computers, the output of those services is complementary to high-skilled labor. When external accountants become cheaper, …rms hire those to work with their internal sta¤ rather than as a substitute. In terms of our model, cities where business services are cheaper would thus have higher n . He endogenizes the variation in business services productivity by allowing for increasing returns to scale in that sector. One advantage of this focus on the business services sector over a focus on learning or matching externalities is that it provides a mechanism through which the external e¤ects on the employment of skilled workers spread somewhat uniformly over a fairly heterogeneous set of sectors, in consonance with Hendricks's (2011) data analysis.
A special role for the business services sector is shared by Duranton and Puga (2004) . They show that this is associated with an increasing specialization of cities by function, meaning that …rms have increasingly concentrated executives and managers in larger cities and production activities in smaller ones. They therefore develop a model in which there are gains to concentrating management in cities with a high concentration of business services. While they do not explicitly tie their model to facts about the skill composition of cities and their wage di¤erentials, it is natural to map workers active in their management function as relatively high-skilled workers and those active in production as relatively low skilled. Given this mapping, their model could also deliver a concentration of high-skilled workers in large cities, as in the data.
Sorting for Unmeasured Skill
Di¤erences in labor demand need not be the only source of the systematic di¤erences in skill composition, wages, and skill premia across cities. An alternative explanation relies on sorting for unobserved worker characteristics. To see how that works, suppose there are multiple types of workers rather than just two, and assume for simplicity that they are all perfect substitutes in production, so that 17
Note that now the production function is the same for all cities. The parameters k capture the marginal product of workers of type k in any city. Since the di¤erent types of workers are perfect substitutes, for any worker type k in any city n, it will be the case that w k n = k . Observed wage variation across cities can occur if di¤erent types of workers are combined in common bins over the course of empirical analysis. For example, a broad "college-educated" group of workers might include workers with some college, with four-year college degrees, and with postgraduate degrees; within each of these bins, workers may have heterogeneous innate abilities. One can then explain many of the empirical facts described in the literature through such sorting (for a detailed exposition see, for example, Davis and Dingel [2017] ).
To see how such an e¤ect of skill sorting could come about, reparameterize the utility function of individual workers to:
that is, a worker requires a minimal amount of housing to survive, which we normalize to 1, but beyond that how much housing they purchase is irrelevant to their utility. This is an extreme form of nonhomotheticity in preferences, with housing considered a "necessity." Note that, in order to show that in this setup it is possible to account for many of the key facts as stemming from di¤erences in labor supply, we now allow for an exogenous city-speci…c variation in amenities, captured by A n . Under this parameterization, the value for a worker of type k of living in city n is
Given the Fréchet distribution of "(i), the fraction of workers of type k living in city n is
As before, the fraction increases with wages and decreases with rents. The di¤erence is that now it increases more rapidly with wages when wages are smaller. Substituting in the labor demand condition
As rents in a city increase, the labor composition shifts toward workers with higher productivity. Finally, note that since all households buy one unit of housing, housing market equilibrium implies that:
Since labor supply is increasing in the city-speci…c amenity and decreasing in rents, it follows that rents have to increase with the cityspeci…c amenity. Thus, cities with higher amenities also have higher rents and a more skilled workforce. If skill di¤erences are not directly observable, this could translate into higher measured wages for each skill level. If skill di¤erences are particularly hard to observe among the most highly skilled workers, this sorting would translate into a higher wage premium for those cities.
The mechanism described here could be criticized on a priori grounds, since it relies on assuming that housing is a necessity. As a matter of fact, while the share of expenditures on shelter does decrease with income, it decreases by relatively little, with higher-income households spending more dollars. Furthermore, one implication of the sorting mechanism is that more-skilled workers are less sensitive to city-speci…c prices. This is contrary to much evidence that …nds high-skilled workers to be more mobile. 18 While such a priori criticism could potentially be accommodated with suitable changes to the model without abandoning some of the key insights, more direct empirical assessments have not been favorable to sorting for unobservable characteristics. A …rst approach, adopted by Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) , is to assess the e¤ects of sorting on city wage di¤erences through worker …xed e¤ects. Those exercises rely on changes in the wages of workers who migrate between cities to separate the e¤ects of sorting from other city characteristics. 19 While this …rst approach indicates a large role for sorting, it could underestimate or overestimate those e¤ects to the extent that changes in the wages of migrants are not representative of the di¤erences in wages of the overall population of cities. For example, if individuals migrate from small cities to large cities only when they receive particularly good wage o¤ers, this selection e¤ect would lead to an overestimation of the relationship between city size and wages. On the other hand, if workers move to large cities when they are young, take advantage of local learning opportunities to slowly become better workers, and then move back to smaller cities carrying their new abilities with them, such evidence would tend to underestimate the contribution of large cities to worker productivity since wages would change little at the time of moving. Pavan (2012) and De La Roca and Puga (2017) speci…cally control for these e¤ects and …nd that allowing for learning within cities is especially important. Once that learning is explicitly allowed for, selection for unobservable skills ceases to be an important source of bias in estimating the e¤ect of city size on productivity.
CONCLUSION
Inequality in the United States has an important spatial component. More-skilled workers tend to reside in larger cities where they earn higher wages. In the meantime, less-skilled workers make lower wages even when they live in those cities. Those relationships appear to have become more pronounced as inequality has increased. The evidence points to externalities among high-skilled workers as a signi…cant contributor to those patterns. This suggests that policy may face an equity e¢ ciency trade-o¤. The presence of positive externalities among high-skilled workers would imply gains to policies that incentivize them to become more concentrated. However, this would tend to increase inequality across and within cities. As pointed out by Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2018) , who discuss these trade-o¤s in detail, the inability to separate the place one lives from the place one works may lead a utilitarian planner to choose to redistribute income across cities so as to compensate workers who have high amenity value of living in lowproductivity cities. While the aforementioned paper provides a substantial …rst step in that direction, the literature thoroughly exploring these trade-o¤s from various angles is still in its infancy.
APPENDIX Appendix 1: Derivation of Labor Supply and Average Utility with Frechet Distributed Preferences
Under a Fréchet distribution, " n has a support between zero and in…nity with c.d.f. " n is e " n ; and the p.d.f. is " 1 n e " n . Note that in order for any value x to be smaller than the max of several variables, it must be the case that it is smaller than each one of them. Given that individual draws of " n are independent, we can calculate this probability by multiplying the individual c.d.f.'s. Speci…cally, for any given" n .
Pr " n w k n =(r n ) max
To …nd Pr " n w k n =(r n ) max n 0 6 =n " n 0 w k n 0 =(r n 0 ) integrate over all" n , i.e., calculate
where now
. The integrand is equal to the pdf of a Fréchet with scale parameter and which must therefore integrate to 1. It follows that
We can also derive average utility in each city. This is given by E h " n w k n r n j" n w k n =(r n ) max n 0 6 =n " n 0 w k n 0 =(r n 0 ) i . Again, we can write this as
where the …rst equality follows from the de…nition of conditional expectation, and the third equality follows from the fact that the integrand is the expected value of a Fréchet with scale parameter .
Appendix 2: Comparative Statics with Heterogeneous Preferences
The model can be summarized by the following system of equations:
Consider an equilibrium where all cities have the same n . Loglinearize around that equilibrium to get:
where we use dy n to denote the log deviation of Y n from the identical city case and where
We can show that = . To see this, solving the demand equations for w k n and multiplying both sides by
Plugging those equations in the formula for yields the formulas for .
Next, use the log-linearized housing demand equation (14) to eliminate dh k n from the housing market clearing equation (13) and rearrange to get
Use the labor supply equation (10) to substitute out dw k n from the other equations in the system and rearrange. De…ne ddy n = dy n d y;
where d y denotes the cross-city average log-change in Y n and analogously for other variables. The system becomes:
Using equations (15), (16), and (17) to substitute out ddl k n from equation (19) and using = yields an expression for rents as a function of productivity.
Manipulating (15), (16), and (17) to obtain an expression ddy n as a function of ddr n , we can substitute the expression above to get:
For the limiting case with ! 1, this yields
For the other limiting case, with = 0
We can also obtain expressions for ddl L n and ddl H n :
It follows that ddl L n > 0 if 1 > , i.e., if land share is su¢ ciently small or the two types of labor are not too strongly substitutable. Normal calibrations feature ' 1 3 and ' 2, so that the condition is satis…ed and population grows for both types of workers with n , although most strongly for the high type.
Again, with ! 1 the expressions simplify to
and we verify that with = 0 employment does not change:
Calculating real wages, we get:
Thus, real wages will increase or decrease in relative terms with relative employment. With ! 1; we have that real wages do not change in relative terms at all. With = 0, 
Comparative Statics with Housing as a Necessity
With housing as a necessity good as in subsection 2.5, we can derive the labor supply function following the same steps as in Appendix 1 to get:
It follows that, using the same "deviation" notation as above
Since all workers buy one unit of housing, the housing market equilibrium equation can be written as:
Suppose the production function is the same in all cities but housing supply is not. The equations de…ning the equilibrium of the economy in log-linearized form become: 
Use the new labor supply equation (22) to eliminate wages from the labor demand equations and the production function to eliminate output:
Combine those with the production function and substitute out the new housing clearing equilibrium (24) to obtain:
ddl
Solve the system for ddl L n and ddl H n as functions of ddr n . From inspection of the structure of the problem, it follows that:
where ' 
Substituting back into the housing market clearing equation yields:
It follows that interest rates fall with housing supply, and employment in both sectors rises. At the same time, the labor mix will change. So long as w H w L is su¢ ciently greater than 1, skilled labor will increase more rapidly with housing supply than unskilled labor. At the same time, because the elasticity of labor supply at the city level is not in…nity, wages for skilled labor will have to grow faster.
Consider now an environment with three worker types, L, HL; and HH. The production function is now
For simplicity, we will focus on the case with ! 1 so that highand low-skilled workers are also perfect substitutes. Suppose now there are common city-speci…c amenities, so that their utility of living in city n is now:
where A n represents amenities such as good public schools or nice weather. Those factors are common for all types of labor. Labor supply for k 2 fLH; HHg
Using the fact that di¤erent types of labor are perfect substitutes so that their wages do not vary in the cross-section, the log-linearized system in deviation form becomes:
ddl k n = r w k r ddr n + dda k n ; k 2 fL; HL; HHg; It follows that rental rates rise with amenities. At the same time, from equation (26) it follows immediately that employment reacts more to interest rates if wages are smaller. Thus, a given increase in amenities will imply larger increases in the population of workers with higher wages. At the same time, even though wages do not change, if one cannot observe HL and HH type workers separately, one will see their average wage rise, as the composition of high-skilled workers shifts toward the ones with a very high skill. Thus, cities with higher amenities will have a more skilled labor force and higher wage premia. One can further generate the correlation with city size by allowing housing supply to be rent elastic.
